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Abstract 
The importance of Business Process Modeling (BPM) particularly in sensitive areas combined with the rising 
impact of legislative requirements on IT operations results in a need to conceptually represent security seman-
tics in BPM. We define critical security semantics that need to be incorporated in BPM to aid documentation of 
security needs and support compliant behavior of security systems. We analyze ways to express such semantics 
in BPM and their possible role in designing and operating internal control systems, which ensure and document 
the execution of compliance-related activities. The analysis shows that there are informal, semi-formal and for-
mal approaches to represent security semantics in BPM. We consider the informal approaches as best suited to 
express security objectives and their formal counterparts as best to specify security mechanisms to enforce the 
objectives. All three groups of approaches have the potential to enhance the expressiveness and informative 
value of an internal control system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Business Process Modeling (BPM) has reached key importance in modern enterprises: Process models are used 
to plan, communicate, analyze and improve value-creating task flows within and between departments and even 
across multiple organizations. For a long time, BPM has reached business areas that are critical for the com-
pany's success and even survival, for example financial transactions, thus calling for the incorporation of security 
requirements and features. A major driver to consider security semantics in BPM is the rising need for compliant 
enterprise IT: Companies are facing an increasing number of legislative and contractual regulations that pose 
implicit and partially explicit requirements on the operation and security of the company's IT systems. A well-
known example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, tightening the requirements for correct and reliable financial report-
ing. Commonly used to comply to such legislations or even explicitly required are internal control systems 
(ICS), composed of processes which enforce and monitor correct behavior and produce documentation of rele-
vant actions. As of now, most of these tasks involved in planning and operating an ICS are carried out manually, 
resulting in a high cost of achieving compliance.  
Currently, most common BPM techniques do not address security in a sufficient manner. The resulting lack of 
incorporation of security considerations into the software design process leads to late and incomplete embedding 
of security features into the application design and thus to possible vulnerabilities. A number of academic ap-
proaches tackle this issue and aim at expressing security semantics in business process models. This is consid-
ered as one of the first steps in developing a better understanding of the security requirements of the application 
and thus fundamental for documentation of evidence of conformity with corresponding laws and regulations. 
Unfortunately, the most approaches published so far do not have their major focus on the support of compliance 
or supporting the incorporation of the security demands of applications into the design of an ICS. In this paper, 
we evaluate these approaches regarding their potential contribution towards achieving compliance by incorporat-
ing security considerations into BPM and subsequently into design and operation of an ICS. This will result in a 
clearer definition of control objectives and automation of both compliance-related activities and their documen-
tation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we review related work on BPM, compli-
ance and security semantics. In the subsequent section, we derive security semantics whose incorporation into 
BPM would benefit the achievement of compliance followed by an analysis of how to integrate each aspect. This 
is followed by a section in which we compare existing approaches for modeling security in BPM using the de-
fined semantics, followed by a discussion of open challenges and a conclusion in the last section. 
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RELATED WORK 
A plethora of work has been published on BPM techniques and their application in research and practice. Even 
while academics and practitioners see partly differing benefits of it, the overall perception of BPM as a highly 
relevant and useful approach is well-documented (Indulska et al. 2009; Ho et al. 2008). Besides common advan-
tages such as communication, understanding and process improvement, governance aspects gain importance due 
to increasing regulatory requirements. 
Compliance requirements originate from legal frameworks, actual legislation, contractual agreements, standards 
and best practices with a range of different goals, scopes and applicability depending on industry sector, com-
pany size and region (Tarantino 2008). Legal frameworks, such as Basel II1 or the European Data Protection 
Directive2 set requirements that have to be implemented into national legislation. Laws may only be relevant for 
a certain industry sector such as health care, as with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA)3, or only in certain jurisdictions. Adherence to frameworks, standards and best practices such as 
COSO4, a framework for internal control, or ITIL5 is often implicitly or explicitly required to comply with laws, 
contractual agreements and market needs. 
There are only few works bridging the three disciplines compliance, BPM and IT-Security. For example, 
Karagiannis (2008) describes a method to extend BPM in order to achieve regulatory compliance using IT, 
which does however not focus on IT security issues. Neubauer et al. (2009) give a brief overview of existing 
approaches for security in business process management and sketch a roadmap for future research emphasizing 
the importance of considering the strategic business value of any measures undertaken. Kharbili et al. (2008) 
review current work in the context of BPM from the perspective of compliance checking in a short position 
paper. Siponen and Heikka (2008) analyze design methods for secure information systems. However, the BPM 
perspective only plays a minor role in their work. In contrast to the selected work mentioned above, we focus on 
modeling concrete security semantics in BPM with the goal of supporting compliance. 
SECURITY CRITERIA FOR ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE 
In this section, we define security objectives and functions that would be useful for achieving compliance if 
expressed in the context of BPM and integrated into ICS. It would be ideal to be able to express any possible 
security requirement resulting from legislations, contracts and best-practice standards. However, the multitude of 
such compliance texts with differing purposes, often vague specifications and various levels of abstraction make 
it a complicated task to compile such a complete list of requirements. Also, some security requirements are not 
fully applicable to BPM. Instead, our approach is to derive only those requirements resulting from legislative 
texts, associated standards and frameworks that are most common and useful towards achieving compliance. In 
this work, we focus on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 20026 and the European Data Protection Directive, two 
well-known legislations that have been a driver for compliance activities both in practice and scientific research. 
 
 
Figure 1: Security Semantics to be modeled in BPM 
In order to arrive at a set of requirements with impact for compliance considerations, we propose to view secu-
rity in different layers, each representing a different level of abstraction. As depicted in Figure 1, on a top layer, 
we see security objectives. A security function enforces a particular security objective and implements particu-
                                                 
1
 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm 
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice\_home/fsj/privacy/index\_en.htm 
3
 http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html 
4
 http://www.coso.org/ 
5
 http://www.itil-officialsite.com/ 
6
 http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf 
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lar security mechanisms, for example password use or a certain encryption algorithm. Security mechanisms are 
out of scope here, as conceptual modeling should focus on security objectives and functions. However, they are 
necessary for understanding the other two security layers with security functions as an enforcement layer be-
tween security objectives, which pose requirements and security mechanisms that are eventually implemented to 
enforce them. In the context of compliance, we see the ICS as a means for organizing and documenting corre-
sponding activities and measures across security layers. 
Security Objectives 
Legislative texts rarely contain specific instructions on the operation of IT. However, one can derive security 
objectives from the intentions of the law. Likewise, SOX with the goal of ensuring correct and reliable financial 
reporting and preventing fraud through mandatory ICS and increased manager liability, does not contain any 
direct IT-related requirements. Yet, it is clear that correct financial reporting requires integrity of the underlying 
data, meaning that modification of data by unauthorized users or false modification by fault or as a deliberate 
action is prevented. Also, relevant records must be available, meaning that they are not withheld from the system 
in the sense of a denial of service.Other notable legislations, such as the European Data Protection Directive, aim 
at preserving consumer privacy, which is closely related to confidentiality, the prevention of unauthorized or 
improper disclosure of data. Privacy is defined as the right to control collection, storage and dissemination of 
one's information (Herrmann and Herrmann 2006). It can be enhanced through more specific security aspects, 
such as anonymity and unlinkability. Although related to confidentiality, the enforcement mechanisms are dif-
ferent for privacy. 
The three security objectives confidentiality, integrity and availability are commonly referred to as CIA require-
ments. Other examples of security objectives which are not considered here due to less relevance for the ICS are 
orginality (i.e. a digital coin must be original and not an identical copy), proof of communication (i.e. sender 
cannot deny having sent a message or recipient can proof that message was sent) or enforcement of copyright. 
Security Functions 
Another layer of describing IT security are security functions, used to organize enforcement of the security ob-
jectives mentioned above. While the legislation in focus is vague regarding IT security requirements, further 
statements and frameworks get more specific, in the case of SOX the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board's7 (PCAOB) Auditing Standard Nr. 5, the control framework CobiT and related standards such as ISO 
27001. In these documents, references to particular security functions can be found.  
User identification and authentication, as well as authorization and access control are seen as the most important 
security functions to achieve compliance with SOX (Haworth and Pietron 2006). Authentication means ensuring 
that an entity has the identity it claims to have, while authorization means specifying access rights to resources. 
Access control is important for fulfilling the security objectives, as they distinguish between authorized and non-
authorized use. Auditing, recording security events such as access decisions for later analysis is another related 
security function. Being system-related, it should be distinguished from internal and external audits performed to 
document compliance to laws and standards that usually have a broader scope. While access control is concerned 
with single entities accessing resources, Separation of Duties (SoD) is a further security function to prevent 
fraud by single users. Based on access control, yet especially important when it comes to performing tasks, as 
with business processes, it requires that certain actions have to be performed by different actors. Another related 
security function is the Four-Eye Principle, requiring that one particular action can only be performed by two 
actors together. 
Internal Control and Documentation 
Besides fulfilling the original security objectives and functions posed by relevant legislation and frameworks, it 
is necessary to coordinate and document the compliant behavior to prove compliance. As illustrated in Figure 1, 
ICS are commonly used to organize and monitor activities to achieve compliance, including IT security meas-
ures. Internal control can be described as a process itself, providing assurance about achieving company objec-
tives. As in SOX, which explicitly demands the use of an adequate ICS, the term typically refers to controls over 
financial reporting, but may have a broader scope. Each control is designed to achieve a certain control objective 
and it has to be tested if the design is suitable to reach the objective and if it is carried out correctly (Karagiannis 
2008).  
 
 
                                                 
7
 http://pcaobus.org/ 
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Table 1. Security semantics to be expressed in BPM for compliance 
Security semantics Rationale 
integrity reliable and  correct financial reporting (SOX), integrity of personal data re-
quired by EU Data Protection Directive (Steinke 2002) 
availability critical financial data needed for reporting (SOX), data retention requirements 
(Fox and Zonneveld 2006) 
privacy EU Data Protection Directive (Fischer-Hübner 2001; Steinke 2002), HIPAA 
confidentiality support privacy, protect sensitive information (SOX) (Fox and Zonneveld 
2006) 
authorization, access 
control 
enforce CIA requirements, most important for SOX (Haworth and Pietron 
2006) 
authentication prerequisite for authentication and access control 
separation of duties 
(SoD) 
required by SOX-related statements (Haworth and Pietron 2006) 
ICS internal controls explicity  required by SOX 
documentation prove compliant behaviour in external audits 
adherence to business 
process control flow 
ensure correct execution of critical processes, existence of required processes 
 
Most IT-related controls fall into the categories IT General Controls (ITGC) and IT Application Controls 
(ITAC): ITGC cover security requirements that are process-independent such as physical access or change man-
agement and support proper functioning of ITAC, which are application-based and each related to a certain busi-
ness process (Fox and Zonneveld 2006). The design of an ICS follows its purpose. To become compliant to SOX 
for example, processes influencing financial statements with related risks are identified. Then ITAC to cover 
these risks are designed, which subsequently rely on ITGC. 
It would be beneficial to design controls addressing the security objectives and functions identified as relevant 
for compliance. Modeling corresponding security semantics in BPM would help identifying relevant processes 
and related IT-systems. Also useful are semantics to model internal controls themselves. In addition to security 
requirements that may be applied to business process models or their elements, one common requirement ex-
pressed in ICS is the existence and performance of certain processes such as a change management process or a 
user management process, as recommended by the COSO-Framework. Therefore it is necessary to ensure the 
existence of such processes and enforce adherence to their control flow. Those processes commonly include 
multiple actors with different privileges, thus illustrating the aforementioned need for access control. Adherence 
to a designed work flow is also important for critical business processes that are vital to the legislation that is 
considered (Haworth and Pietron 2006). 
To be able to prove compliant behavior and security measures in audits, sufficient documentation is needed. 
Process models themselves may serve as a documentation of the design of security measures and controls. How-
ever, the model itself does not cover information about the actual process execution, therefore retaining of sys-
tem event data for critical operations is advisable. Approaches to incorporate security semantics in business 
processes can contribute towards proper documentation by allowing the identification of critical activities and 
security measures whose execution and parameters must be recorded.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the security semantics that we consider as useful to be integrated into BPM in order to 
achieve compliance. 
ANALYZING CONCEPTUAL BUSINESS PROCESS SECURITY MODELING 
In this section, first we examine different proposals to model security objectives and security functions in 
business process models in order to support achieving compliance. Then we discuss which semantics can benefit 
the design and implementation of an ICS. The analysis will be illustrated using representative examples of exist-
ing techniques. 
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Conceptual Modeling at the Security Objective Level 
Modeling the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) security objectives in the context of business processes 
brings about two challenges: Firstly, conceptual business process models are mostly composed of activities, 
which differ from data, to which the security objectives are applied originally and by definition. If a security 
objective, for example integrity, were to be applied to a business process activity, the question, what should be 
protected from unauthorized modification, occurs. One could assume that implicitly the data involved in per-
forming the activity is meant. This would require a definition of the data related to each activity, as included in 
some BPM techniques. Also, according to their definitions, confidentiality, integrity and availability distinguish 
between authorized and non-authorized entities, thus requiring a declaration about who is authorized.  
Röhrig and Knorr (2004) present a method to define security requirements concerning artifacts, activities and 
actors in business processes and to derive security measures. Similarly to conceptual modeling of Mandatory 
Access Control (Pernul et al. 1998), activities and artifacts are assigned security levels in each of the categories 
confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability while actors are assigned clearance levels in those cate-
gories. Thus, the question of authorized entities is answered implicitly. Yet, there is little explanation on the 
semantics when the security goals are applied to activities. Consistency checks ensure that there are no conflicts 
between the modeled security levels and that actor's clearances are high enough to perform the tasks they were 
assigned to. The next step is to automatically derive appropriate security measures from a predefined matrix 
using a special language introduced by the authors. This step however depends on the quality of the predefined 
security measures. In the context of an ICS, this approach has two benefits: Firstly, the assignment of security 
levels and clearances serves as a documentation on which authorization decisions are based on. Furthermore, 
chosen security measures can be justified with the matrix resulting from the security assignments. 
Röhm et al. (1999) and Herrman and Herrman (2006) distinguish between different business process elements in 
their approach to analyze security requirements in business process models expressed through UML activity 
diagrams. Among 14 distinct security requirements, confidentiality, integrity and availability may be modeled on 
the conceptual level using security requirement objects that are represented through icons mapped to business 
process elements. Being consistent with their definition, confidentiality, integrity and availability may be linked 
to the entities of the process element class information which is in turn linked to activities. Also, confidentiality 
may be linked to process activities, however the exact semantics of how an activity can become confidential are 
not included. Security requirements are assigned levels of importance on a scale of one to seven. In later stages 
of the methodology, software and hardware building blocks are selected based on these ratings. The definition of 
authorized entities for confidentiality, integrity and availability is not further addressed, but can possibly be 
performed in later refinement stages.  
Rodriguez et al. (2007a; 2007b) introduce extensions for the metamodels of both UML activity diagrams and the 
Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN), which allow the specification of security requirements in busi-
ness process models. The extension is performed through a predefined set of stereotypes representing a broad 
range of security requirements which can be linked to business process elements. The security objective integrity 
is modeled through a stereotype that can be annotated to process elements representing stored data and mes-
sages. The stereotype allows the specification of a protection degree, a connection to authorized entities is how-
ever not made. 
These three approaches show that the application of CIA requirements to business process models is best per-
formed by addressing elements representing data or flow objects while the application of these objectives on 
activities leaves open questions about their actual meaning. Still, these techniques allow expressing requirements 
which may serve as control objectives and thus as a basis for the design of security controls in an ICS. The dis-
tinction between authorized and other entities from the security objectives' point of view has been omitted, per-
formed implicitly or postponed so far. This issue is addressed by approaches applying notions of access control 
to BPM, which are discussed in the following subsection. While the CIA requirements discussed so far are 
mostly relevant for SOX, other legislation, for example the EU Data Protection Directive focus on privacy. To 
model this security objective, Herrmann and Herrmann (2006) allow placing a corresponding requirement tag on 
elements representing information in UML activity diagrams. They distinguish privacy, here representing con-
trol over one's information, from anonymity, which they see as hiding the true identity of an actor. Consistently, 
anonymity tags may be annotated to agents. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (left), in which the anonymity tag is 
attached to the role Patient. Rodríguez et al. ( 2007b) apply privacy stereotypes to activities or groups of activi-
ties, posing the requirement, that the identity of the actor carrying out these activities is not disclosed. In Figure 
2 (right), the privacy stereotype is applied to the swim lane Patient, thus applying to all activities that are per-
formed by actors of that role. Once again, such techniques allow assessment of potential control objectives and 
are a starting point for the design of ICS that address privacy legislation. One has to ensure that modeled seman-
tics are clearly defined, for example also by defining against which actors the privacy needs to be protected. 
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Figure 2: Anonymity requirement in the notation of Herrmann and Herrmann (2006) (left) and privacy require-
ment in the notation of Rodríguez et al. (2007a) (right) 
Conceptual Modeling at the Security Function Level 
As highlighted earlier, the notion of access control is of major importance to achieve compliance. A plethora of 
work has been published with the aim of applying access control to business processes. Atluri and Huang (1996) 
first presented a model for synchronizing data access rights to work flow activities, thus ensuring that actors 
currently executing a task have proper rights for documents involved in that task. The approach was later ex-
tended to applying role-based access control (RBAC) directly to business process tasks, meaning that only actors 
belonging to a certain role could execute specific tasks (Ahn et al. 2000). This marks the shift of focus from data 
objects to business process activities as a protected resource. At this point, it is important to distinguish between 
access rights on data, which could range from read and write to append access, while an activity can merely be 
executed or not. All of these approaches are presented in a formal and abstract fashion, however, a visual presen-
tation in a process model is feasible as long as the amount of modeled semantics does not become confusingly 
large. 
Access control semantics can be found in other approaches that are not solely devoted to it as well. Extensions 
for UML and BPMN introducing security semantics include access control stereotypes. In the extension pre-
sented by Rodríguez et al. (2007b), the stereotype representing the access control requirement may be linked to 
activities or groups of activities and has to be connected to a role, thus employing RBAC. In UMLSec, intro-
duced by Jürjens (2005), a stereotype representing an access control requirement is applied to a whole activity 
diagram, specifying roles, rights and protected activities using tags. Lodderstedt et al. (2002) describe a UML 
meta model containing permissions that link actions, roles and model elements. Here, action types such as read 
may be specified for any element type, thus allowing any UML model element to become a protected resource. 
Due to the graphic nature of the underlying models, the annotated security semantics are displayed visually as 
well. Yet, some information, such as tag values of the stereotypes may not be shown in this kind of view. Swim 
lanes, rows or columns, in which a group of activities is placed, are a common way to denote that certain de-
partments or actors are assigned to carry out those activities, thus complementing access control semantics. 
In the context of ICS with the purpose of accomplishing compliance, these approaches are highly relevant for 
several reasons: They allow restricting execution rights of activities to owners of certain roles, thus decreasing 
the possibility to compromise integrity and confidentiality of related data and privacy. Secondly, many processes 
that are part of an ICS apply the concept of roles, defining for example a control owner responsible for carrying 
out control actions or actors that are allowed to approve software change requests (Fox 2006). Lastly, applying 
access control to BPM allows for further security functions, such as SoD. 
These access control semantics cover authorization implicitly, basing access decisions on the fact that a user has 
a certain role. Also, it is assumed and required that the user has been identified and authenticated before, as the 
way this has been accomplished is not considered. To ensure accountability in highly critical scenarios it could 
become important, how reliable and trustworthy the user authentication is implemented. One could model the 
method of authentication, for example by knowledge or by possession, as done by Wolter et al. (2009). How-
ever, this may move the focus away from the semantic view with security objectives and functions to a more 
implementation centric view that names particular security mechanisms. Still, modeling the required trust in the 
authentication process through abstract values instead of the particular authentication method would be a feasible 
way. 
The notion of SoD has also been identified as highly important for achieving compliance as it is a measure to 
avoid abuse of privileges and is also mentioned in control frameworks (Fox 2006). The application of SoD to 
BPM can be performed through constraints extending access control semantics. Bertino et al. (1997) introduced 
formal constraints on the assignment of either roles or users to tasks both at process design time and at execution 
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time. Another formal model that allows expressing not only SoD but also delegation semantics has been pub-
lished by Wainer et al. (2007). SoD rules are mostly presented using formal statements, thus possibly unintuitive 
to casual users. A visual presentation of such rules has been demonstrated (Knorr and Stormer 2001), however, 
as with access control semantics, displaying a large amount of constraints graphically may become too confus-
ing. Another way to hide the complexity of formal statements regarding SoD are predefined patterns as pre-
sented by Kumar and Liu (2008). However, they reduce the range of possible statements that can be defined. 
Internal Control and Documentation 
As stated in the previous sections, the existence and operation of an ICS is essential to organize compliance 
actions and even mandatory under some legislations such as SOX. Modeling business process security semantics 
can benefit designing and implementing the ICS: Firstly, modeled security objectives that highlight critical ac-
tivities and help identify related IT-systems can be used to identify control objectives and construct correspond-
ing control activities. Secondly, controls can utilize security functions, for example by proving their reliability 
through correctly implemented as access control and SoD. Furthermore, controls themselves can be modeled 
using BPM and incorporating security functions, such as access control for defining a control owner role. 
Beyond the security semantics in a narrow sense, one needs to keep in mind that internal controls cover a very 
broad range and that only a small subset address IT-related issues. Thus, even in non-IT related areas, compli-
ance can be achieved by modeling controls in business processes. Sadiq et al. (2007) model control objectives 
using Formal Contract Language (FCL), thus making normative assertions such as obligations and permissions 
and specifying consequences in case of violations. The business process model is then annotated with visual 
control tags that can be derived automatically from the FCL-statements. On process execution, obligations occur 
from the modeled control objectives. Failure to fulfill them results in violations and corresponding recovery 
actions have to be performed. Thus, the previously defined security aspect adherence to control flow is benefited 
as well. The modeled requirements contain predicates that use parameters such as subjects, roles, time or arti-
facts thus enabling assertions about access control and SoD. For such compliance requirements, a range of con-
trol patterns is proposed by the authors. The process model is not changed, but only annotated and may be 
viewed without any annotations. Figure 3 illustrates some possible annotations generated from FCL statements: 
The first tag, GoodShipmentNotices represents a control defining that shipments are made timely or a penalty is 
charged, the second tag adds a time constraint for sending goods and invoice and the rightmost tag requires that 
the purchase order must be included in the invoice. While the resulting annotated process models are presented 
in a visual fashion, the FCL statements are of a very formal nature and thus possibly unintuitive. Also, as one 
can see in Figure 3, the annotated model is not self-contained as the predicates and variables used in the tags are 
defined elsewhere. 
 
Figure 3: Process Model with annotated control tags (Sadiq et al. 2007) 
As compliant structures and behavior need to be proven in audits, sufficient documentation is necessary for be-
coming compliant. In the context of BPM, we distinguish between documenting process models, which is inde-
pendent of how, when and by whom they where performed, and documenting the actual execution of a process. 
Trivially, process models are documentation themselves, but they carry no meaning on whether they are compli-
ant or not. Goedertier and Vanthienen (2007) propose expressing compliance requirements regarding obligations 
and permissions for executing activities and their control flow and sequence through “temporal deontic assign-
ments”. Using these declarative statements, one can automatically generate a business process model that may be 
used for validation. With rules regarding the sequence of activities, time-based permissions and obligations, the 
range of possible security semantics is limited. Yet, for supporting compliance, the main benefit of the approach 
is to document that a business process design complies to a certain set of rules.  
Documentation of the process execution may become quite extensive if every secure action that was carried out 
is included. A solution for this problem is to label those activities that are relevant for documentation, so that 
corresponding data is stored on execution (Rodríguez 2007a). 
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Table 2. Evaluation of the approaches 
Authors Security Criteria 
 C I A P Auth A/AC SoD ICS Doc BP-CF 
Informal approaches 
Herrmann and Herrmann (2006) 
          
Jensen and Feja (2009) 
          
Semi-formal approaches 
Röhrig and Knorr (2004) 
          
Rodríguez et al. (2007a; 2007b) 
          
Jürjens (2005) 
          
Wolter et al. (2009) 
          
Formal approaches 
Kumar and Liu (2008) 
          
Goedertier and Vanthienen (2007) 
          
Sadiq et al. (2007) 
          
Formal approaches solely devoted to authorization, access control and SoD 
Ahn et al. (2000) 
          
Lodderstedt et al. (2002) 
          
Bertino et al. (1997) 
          
Wainer et al. (2007) 
          
C: Confidentiality, I: Integrity, A: Availability, P: Privacy, Auth: Authentication, A/AC: Authorization and Access 
Control, SoD: Separation of Duties, ICS: Internal Control System, Doc: Documentation, BP-CF: BP control flow,  
: Fully implemented or supported,  : not explicitly addressed, yet possible to express,  : not supported 
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION 
Table 2 shows the most representative approaches to incorporate security into BPM we have analyzed and indi-
cates which of the semantics relevant for compliance we have derived are supported. We structure them into 
informal, semi-formal and formal approaches. We consider approaches that express semantics mostly using 
graphical notations with little or no further parameter specifications as informal. As shown in Table 2, such ap-
proaches mostly address security objectives, of which we selected the CIA requirements and privacy as most 
relevant. We define the next group, semi-formal approaches, as using security semantics that require clearly 
defined attributes in given data types, accompanied by a graphical notation. Their range of possible security 
semantics is wide, still including mostly security objectives, but also supporting some security functions. Formal 
approaches employ mathematically exact statements. One can see that such approaches do not consider security 
objectives, but security functions and support for ICS, selective documentation and adherence to the control 
flow. Lastly, a subset of the formal approaches only addresses authorization, access control and related SoD 
issues. Almost all approaches contain support for expressing authorization and access control semantics, while 
authentication is almost always not addressed. 
This evaluation leads to implications regarding the approaches' applicability in ICS. As the identification of 
security objectives in BPM can aid the design of an ICS by deducting possible control objectives, this could be 
performed using informal approaches. Besides the support of security objectives, due to their informal nature 
they would carry the benefit of being accessible to most stakeholders. The formal approaches on the other hand, 
are suitable for the actual control design, as they support security functions that enforce security objectives and 
are the link to implementation through security mechanisms. Their formal nature allows for a verifiable control 
design. Also, surrounding organizational issues, namely documentation and adherence to control flow, are sup-
ported. Lastly, besides explicit support for supporting ICS, the semi-formal approaches address all of the se-
lected security semantics. The challenge in applying them to ICS and achieving compliance lies in combining 
the advantages of both other groups, being understandable for most stakeholders while allowing concise and 
verifiable statements. 
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CONCLUSION AND OPEN CHALLENGES 
Based on legislation and further related statements and standards, we identified security semantics relevant to 
achieving compliance by modeling them in BPM and subsequently integrating them into the design and opera-
tion of ICS. We grouped those semantics into security objectives, security functions and defined the ICS itself as 
a third category for organization and documentation. A wide area of security semantics may be modeled using 
existing conceptual modeling extensions, with authorization and access control being most important and most 
commonly applied. Modeling security semantics in BPM can benefit design and operation of ICS by deriving 
control objectives from security objectives, by making correct implementation security functions a target of 
control activities and by modeling the control itself. Distinguishing between informal, semi-formal and formal 
approaches leads to the observation that security objectives are mostly adopted by the informal and semi-formal 
approaches, while the formal approaches mostly address security functions and ICS-related semantics. While the 
various examined approaches provide ways to express security semantics in BPM in a meaningful way, an inte-
grated model covering all identified semantics is still missing. Also, presenting the semantics in an expressive 
yet intuitive manner remains a challenge.  
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